Brain Food for Pioneering Spirits: Is there responsibility without action? Dr. Yasemin Yazan and Jürgen dig into a Wikipedia definition of responsibility line by line, arrive at the provocative claim “no responsibility without action, but also no action without responsibility,” and test it against Nelson Mandela, Gandhi, and a mayor elected by just 15% of a 30%-turnout electorate. Along the way: why deciding not to decide is itself a decision, and why not voting might be the clearest case yet that inaction carries its own weight of responsibility.
Note: This session was recorded live in German as part of the Deep Talk Club, so the video above is German-language audio only. What follows is an English translation of the conversation, lightly edited for readability — the back-and-forth between the moderator and participants is preserved, but the original timestamps and speaker names have been left out.
Yasemin opened the room a few minutes late, having had to close a noisy window right as the room was starting, and introduced today’s topic: Action vs. Inaction and Responsibility — building on the previous day’s room, exploring to what extent action or inaction ties into individual and societal responsibility. She brought along a Wikipedia definition of responsibility to open with: responsibility is primarily the ability to assess one’s own capabilities and the possible consequences of decisions, and to act so that the expected goals are most likely achieved — often bound up with the awareness of carrying blame and shame in case of failure. From this, voluntary (conscientious) or involuntary (through ignorance or external determination) responsibility can emerge: a commitment to answer for the possible consequences of an action or decision, and, if necessary, to be accountable or accept punishment. A sense of responsibility presupposes a conscience, along with knowledge of values, legal rules, and social norms. She noted the definition continues at length, but found it fascinating already, since it packs in concepts like guilt and shame, awareness, voluntariness, ignorance, and external determination — all tying back to norms and morality. She left it deliberately open where they wanted to pick up from here, reminded newcomers the room was recorded and would be published, and repeated the three room rules: a recognizable profile photo, first and last name, and at least one sentence in the bio — or, alternatively, contributing via chat.
After a brief pause with no one joining the stage, she nearly had to close the room, previewing that the next day would continue with an Author Breakfast featuring Dr. Johanna Dahm, presenting the third volume of “Atlas of Decision-Makers,” on how professionals master dynamics, complexity and stress. Just then, Jürgen joined.
Yasemin welcomed him, checking upfront whether he’d be able to stay for the whole room, since starting without being able to continue would be difficult. Jürgen said he’d try, and felt the odds were good. He first offered feedback on Yasemin’s opening definition, which he liked very much — not because he considers everything from Wikipedia unreliable, but because this particular definition contained three key concepts he considers essential: awareness of responsibility, knowledge, and conscience. In his view, these three factors are, on a meta-level, the key determinants of the nature and scope of responsibility. He noted he knew of no other candidate factor, with one open question: when does responsibility actually arise? He recalled a recurring heuristic he’d seen across various publications — impossible to attribute to one specific source, but consistent in tone — that there’s no responsibility without action, but also no action without responsibility. Reading that, he thought: their theme is action versus inaction — so his first point of inquiry, beyond the terminology itself, was whether inaction, too, grounds responsibility. Trying to place responsibility within a process sequence, he sketched it roughly as: their overarching theme of thinking, or reflection, is the essential precondition; the output of that thinking generates a decision aimed at solving a problem or opening new perspectives; and then, in conscious action, comes an activity that — as discussed the day before — leads to change (with a nod to learning as the connecting point). His question: when exactly does responsibility arise, especially in light of the “no responsibility without action” idea? To put it plainly: the moment I mentally arrive at a decision to do or to refrain from doing something, I already step into responsibility — differentiated between self-responsibility and responsibility toward others. He offered this as a first starting point.
Yasemin thanked him, noting how many aspects were already packed into this, and suggested they first look more closely at the concept of responsibility itself, particularly the notion of awareness of responsibility that Jürgen had highlighted, and whether awareness itself plays a role in answering his question. She invited him to elaborate.
Jürgen said it depends, of course, on how one defines awareness — and tried to get more concrete about why he’d raised the question at all: in that intermediate step between thinking and acting, one becomes clear (deliberately not saying “conscious,” but “clear”) about the scope of responsibility one will carry once thought turns into action. He connected this to the sanctions, punishments, or possibly praise and validation mentioned in the definition, and asked: does this weighing-up, this becoming clear about what’s coming, already constitute responsibility even before I’ve actually acted? He proposed yes — disagreeing that responsibility requires an action, precisely because of what he calls self-responsibility. If someone thinks something through fully and arrives at a conclusion — the best example being a decision to refrain from acting — then, as they’d already defined, that’s itself a form of acting, through omission. But even without any externally visible action, one still has to answer to oneself for that decision not to act.
Yasemin picked up on this, noting it gets genuinely interesting here: does one always actually answer to oneself in that way? She raised the legal system as a counterpoint — sanctions can also come from outside, societally or legally, meaning there might be an external instance holding someone accountable, regardless of whether that inner accountability happens automatically at all. She asked Jürgen to weigh in.
Jürgen said this is heavily shaped by the other two components: knowledge, particularly experiential knowledge, and conscience. He pointed to historical figures like Nelson Mandela, Martin Luther King, and Gandhi, all of whom were fully aware they were violating laws and norms, yet consciously stepped into self-responsibility through their decision to act (or not act). For him, self-responsibility is itself an expression of one’s freedom and self-determination — whether I decide today, through a thought process, that I will act and thereby take responsibility, or that I claim the freedom to act even when others would deny me that freedom. This, he said, connects back to their earlier bridge toward education — it’s a core element of self-determination, self-actualization, and self-improvement.
Yasemin thanked him and welcomed Sabine, curious what further aspects she might bring, or where she wanted to connect in.
Sabine said she could only stay briefly, since she was about to head into the second part of a workshop titled “Freedom and Responsibility” — which, she noted, echoed exactly what Jürgen had just described, discussed there in slightly different terms but essentially the same tone. Knowledge, in that workshop, had been framed as philosophy, the foundational basis for everything — philosophy itself being something with no simple yes or no, just underlying principles, on which they’d then discussed freedom and responsibility: whether these concepts must be coupled together or not, with differing opinions among participants. The facilitator had repeatedly pointed out that one can make the case either way — imagine, for instance, living in former East Germany versus West Germany: one had far less freedom, the other much more, yet everyone still had to bear responsibility within whatever framework they had. They’d also discussed self-responsibility versus responsibility toward third parties, using a concrete, non-political example: in Mannheim, the mayor had just been elected with only 15% of eligible voters’ support, out of a 30% overall turnout — meaning only 30% of the population had actually gone to vote, fulfilling their civic responsibility, and yet the mayor now claims full political legitimacy, having been “elected by the people of Mannheim.” Where, she asked, is the self-responsibility in that, on the part of everyone who didn’t vote? She said she could stay a few more minutes before having to get back on her bike.
Yasemin thanked her, noting how perfectly this fit, and invited Jürgen to continue. Jürgen thanked Sabine for the contribution and for the bridge it built, showing once again how the dimension expands — from freedom and self-determination all the way to education — into an enormously complex topic. He said he personally appreciates, and values in Yasemin’s moderation, having a concrete anchor point or question to keep moving forward from. He felt this theme of responsibility, tied to their overarching theme, comes close to what he considers the very essence of our being: thinking, acting, being responsible, answering for the consequences to oneself and to others. As an interim conclusion, he said the key takeaway for him was that part of the responsibility they all carry in this room is to pass on this acquired knowledge and help others realize that simply by not acting, one may already be stepping into a position of responsibility.
Yasemin thanked him and picked up his interim conclusion to look at it more closely: given “no responsibility without action, no action without responsibility,” and given that they were discussing action and inaction specifically, does inaction itself ground responsibility — and Sabine’s voting example offered a concrete case to test this. She asked whether there might be certain conditions under which responsibility is grounded in inaction, or whether inaction always grounds responsibility regardless.
Jürgen reaffirmed his position: he explicitly disagrees with the commonly stated view that responsibility arises only from action — there is also responsibility arising from inaction. That’s exactly why he found Sabine’s example so fitting: the widespread reluctance to vote is, at its core, nothing other than a form of taking responsibility for a political or societal decision, just expressed through abstention. He introduced one more concept he felt was missing: alongside becoming clear about the responsibility one takes on by acting or not acting, there’s also an evaluation process taking place — a judgment. He suggested this applies neatly to Sabine’s example: many people today, in his experience, don’t abstain from voting simply because they’re “fed up with politics,” as often claimed, but because, out of some fear of confronting familiar norms or attitudes, they avoid it, expecting negative consequences — even though, deep down, they recognize the responsibility to bring about change. He felt this meant that his earlier meta-level sequence — thinking, deciding, responsibility, acting — was still missing the concept of evaluation, perhaps connecting back to yesterday’s room on generating alternative scenarios.
Yasemin thanked him, noting how much complexity this reveals, and wanted to bring back the concepts of consequence and effect from the day before. If responsibility arises not only from action but also from inaction, the question becomes: responsibility from whose perspective, grounded by whom? Are we talking self-responsibility, or what happens if the person in question doesn’t even see or recognize that responsibility? Staying with the not-voting example: it has a societal effect too, and here they might be bumping into responsibility framed around norms and duties — introducing the concept of duty as well. Where exactly is a duty to do or not do something, to take on or not take on responsibility, actually grounded? She noted there are still enormous entanglements here: they could say responsibility is grounded even in inaction, but how does that hold up personally, evaluatively, both from a societal/political perspective on how not-voting is judged, and from the personal angle of self-responsibility for not having acted. She invited Jürgen to continue.
Jürgen agreed she’d captured it perfectly — this complexity places real demands on whoever is caught in that routine of evaluating and deciding whether to act. For him, this remains fundamentally a function of individual knowledge and education. Even self-awareness, or in this case self-responsibility, presupposes a certain toolkit, a methodology, methodological competence, and, as an essential precondition before any method, that underlying knowledge itself — one has to understand it, know it, sometimes needs someone to point it out. What might look, at first glance, like a simple, easily dismissed topic — acting or refraining, tied to responsibility — actually carries real demands on one’s own knowledge, methodological competence, experiential knowledge, and conscience. This, he stressed, is by no means something that simply falls into our laps — it must be hard-earned, built on foundational knowledge.
Yasemin thanked him, agreeing that “hard-earned” was a lovely way to put it. She noted they’d already flagged a future connection to education, and had touched the day before on learning in relation to change — promising this would be explored in further depth, along with the concept of action competence: what it actually is and everything it encompasses. She then introduced another concept worth bringing in, especially given the following day’s Author Breakfast with Dr. Johanna Dahm on “Atlas of Decision-Makers”: decision-making, and how it fits into this overall complex. She invited Jürgen to build this bridge toward tomorrow’s topic.
Jürgen said this opened a window into his own distant past, specifically his intensive engagement, long ago, with learning psychology, particularly a figure named Correll, who was considered something like the pope of learning psychology in his circles at the time. He recalled, as best he could reconstruct it, that Correll saw responsibility as one of the central motives for making decisions at all. One could, after all, retreat into simply not deciding — as in Sabine’s voting example — but Jürgen would ask: what do you give up by doing that? What do you lack? There’s a possible advantage in being un-attackable, in facing no sanctions, no social exclusion, no insults — but that misses the real core of it. He recalled two or three positions he’d carried through his professional life whenever a decision had to be made: first, that a decision provides a certain kind of certainty — not safety from danger, but the sense that a situation has been resolved, settled, decided. Second, decisions serve an important function for one’s own self-respect: deciding, tying back to what he’d said earlier, is itself a form of freedom and self-determination, self-respect and self-definition. And third — the point he’d actually been trying to hold onto — is precisely self-responsibility: I decide because I want to take responsibility myself, looping back to self-respect — I haven’t dodged, haven’t ducked away, but taken a position, made a decision, and accepted the consequences. Those consequences, he said, are mine to stand behind — that is my own responsibility. He apologized for the length, but felt this was the bridge Yasemin had opened between decision as a key process element and responsibility. He added one final point: responsibility naturally has two dimensions — toward ourselves, and toward others — and what makes it complicated is that it can be judged very differently from each side. What we consider morally good, an act of responsibility, might, as countless current examples show, be seen by others as thoroughly reprehensible.
Yasemin thanked him warmly, and, noting Sabine had rejoined, gave her the floor again. Sabine, cycling, said she’d keep it brief: a new thought had struck her — given they were discussing action, inaction, and responsibility, what about protest action and responsibility specifically? It’s very topical, she noted, with people saying “I don’t agree with this, I’ll show them.” What does self-responsibility look like there — is it even possible?
Yasemin thanked her for the lovely question and invited Jürgen’s take. Jürgen initially misheard Sabine due to audio issues, and after clarification, engaged with the question of protest action. He tried to find the meta-level: protest action, he said, is simply a specific expression of action — whether that’s protest, or shows of approval, or endorsement — that still boils down to the same underlying sequence they’d discussed: a decision, and the specific responsibility tied to it. He wasn’t entirely sure what angle Sabine was probing — whether one should intervene against it, or judge it as good or bad — but suggested this too can be answered on the meta-level: what counts as good or bad is, quite reasonably, judged differently by him or Sabine than by the people behind a given protest, say climate activists gluing themselves to roads. The real question, he said, is how the state and the individual each navigate the responsibility involved — and where a red line is drawn: this is not simply your personal responsibility to exercise as you see fit, because the law, and the rights of the wider community, take precedence here.
Sabine responded that he’d handled that very well, admitting her question had been a bit provocative, and that his meta-level framing had brought her back down to earth. What she’d really meant, though, was more about self-responsibility on a personal level: are people who engage in such protest actually aware of what they’re triggering? Have they genuinely reflected on the concept of self-responsibility, or do they simply charge ahead because everyone else is charging ahead too? She then had to sign off, having arrived at a nearby church for a training session that, she joked, offered a perfect warm-up for exactly this topic.
Yasemin thanked her, glad they’d been able to lay some useful groundwork for Sabine’s own training session too, wished her a wonderful day, and moved into the closing round with Jürgen, given the time, to reflect on the room’s highlights before continuing the following day with the Author Breakfast.
Jürgen closed by noting that, through his professional experience, he’s made it something of a personal obligation to come well-prepared whenever he speaks on a topic he cares about — and this overarching theme of thinking, reflection, and action is, as he’d mentioned before, close to his heart, so a fair amount of groundwork had gone into being ready to contribute. But, he said, getting to the real heart of it: this hour with Yasemin, Sabine, and everyone else in the room had once again shown him that preparation for a complex topic like this is essential groundwork — yet it’s equally astonishing, and deeply motivating for him, what emerges from these connections, thanks not least to Yasemin’s moderation and everyone else’s contributions on stage: fresh points of connection and motivation that arise after a session like this. He admitted an hour like today’s typically leaves him needing at least twice as long afterward to recover — but it’s always worth it; not just often, but always worth it to engage in this kind of constructive exchange. He thanked everyone and wished them a wonderful weekend, even as the weather outside seemed to be turning.
Yasemin thanked both Jürgen and Sabine for the different aspects they’d brought in, and for the connections they were able to build, room by room, deepening different focus themes and constructing new bridges — offering fresh food for thought each time. She noted that some topics, like the concept of action itself, might seem simple on the surface but rarely get the deliberate attention they deserve in daily life, which makes taking the time to examine them all the more valuable. She thanked listeners too for taking the time to join and engage in this deepening, letting their thoughts wander in different directions and seeing what new neural pathways might get activated as a result. She previewed the next day’s Author Breakfast with Dr. Johanna Dahm on “Atlas of Decision-Makers: How Professionals Master Dynamics, Complexity and Stress,” noting how the concept of decision-making ties directly into everything they’d discussed today, and how she was looking forward to exploring how professionals handle exceptional situations — and what, from that, might transfer into everyday life for those of us not typically operating in such high-stakes professional contexts. She invited everyone warmly to join again at 8am under the Bestselling Authors Club/House banner, where she and Johanna, along with co-editors and other authors, would explore the topic together, with plenty of room for audience questions and thoughts as always. She closed by wishing everyone a wonderful day, whatever they had planned, and said she was looking forward to being back on air with everyone the next morning. Until then, ciao!
